Are beliefs a matter of
morality? Can we be blamed for holding them? Do we have an obligation to
believe one thing or another? Is it possible to hold beliefs that do not
affect reality?
Beliefs, says Stanford philosopher Allen Wood, are
most frequently held to be subject to moral praise or blame on the grounds
of
content obligations
(e.g., beliefs in God, racial
superiority, slavery as a justified social system, the occurrence of the
Holocaust) or on the grounds of procedural obligations (e.g., beliefs that
are formed
or maintained on the basis of authoritative arguments or personal experience).
Concluding that the distinction between these two categories
inevitably breaks down, Wood turns instead to the consideration of the "evidentialist principle," in
which content and procedural obligations are understood to be fundamentally
interrelated. Under this principle, morality is evaluated according to
epistemic standards; that is, the set of considerations that are taken
in a certain socio-historical
context to justify belief.
The evidentialist principle is violated often, and
those violations are, in turn, winked at, approved of, and even philosophically
defended. Wood
cites
George W. Bush's invasion of Iraq on the basis of the danger of weapons
of mass destruction as such a violation. Bush, says Wood, gave voice
to a belief
in the presence of such weapons that was stronger than what the evidence
warranted. Bush also violates the evidentiary principle with his continued
insistence,
in post-invasion speeches, that Iraq posed a strong military threat to
the United States--in contradiction of evidence that Iraq had relatively
weak
armed forces prior to invasion.
Wood asserts that the world would be much better off
if there were a higher rate of compliance with the evidentialist principle.
Instead,
we live in
a state of denial, developing myriad ways of evading the principle.
Such mechanisms
of evasions intensify around the issue of religious beliefs, which
are often defended as a matter of faith, not of evidence or proof. Calling
this perspective "impudent," analogous
to the idea that a professional hitman should not be held accountable under
laws designed to punish murder because their actions cannot be justified under
those laws, Wood finds it shocking what "little reflection" people
give to the reasons for their beliefs or epistemic standards for belief.
Entertaining what he considers to be a "thoughtful objection" to
the evidentialist principle, Wood examines the contention that there is a certain
class of beliefs--principally religious--that is not justified by any evidence
but does no harm, even producing joy, consolation, and life enrichment. While
Wood concedes that good consequences may occasionally stem from unsupported
beliefs, the exception is not a reasonable basis for categorical belief. As
there is no proof that unevidentially supported beliefs bring consolation and
joy (e.g., an event that brings about these salutary feelings is undermined
if revealed to be a joke), Wood argues that adopting the belief that unjustified
beliefs are good is, in itself, a violation of the evidentialist principle.
Wood advances two types of moral grounds for the evidentialist
principle: "self-regarding" grounds and "other-regarding" grounds.
The former depart from the axiom that we must regard ourselves as having
value (e.g., Kant's view that humanity is an end in itself). |
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Self-deception,
letting others think for us, hypocrisy (etymologically, "not enough
judgment"), and wishful thinking (a cowardice in the face of uncertainty
that may be depressing or frightening) are all evasions of the "self-regarding" grounds for
the evidentialist principle. Social conformity and acceptance of self-interested
ideological arguments (e.g., in Christian ideals, the inevitability
of communist triumph, or that a CEO's most profitable path is also
by definition the most environmentally sound) are violations of
the "other-regarding" grounds for the evidentialist principle.
We owe it to ourselves and to others, Wood
claims, to exercise our rational capacities, chiefly among them
the ability to weigh evidence. What is best for ourselves
is not to let personal wishes or psychological needs affect our honest communications
with others, but rather to uphold the responsibility to care for our vital
interests.
In religious contexts, questioning dogmas of
faith is often reviled as haughtiness and arrogance against God,
whereas closed-minded dogmatism is passed off as
open-mindedness. This anti-evidentiary position recasts open-mindedness as
turning one's back
on the facts. Faith-based judgments, says Wood, constitute "criminal conduct."
What is worst about violating the evidentialist
principle is the harm that can result. United Nations weapons inspector
Hans Blix has said of the United
States'
decision to invade Iraq that it was based on the failure of leaders to
judge critically the evidence gathered over a period of years.
This method of believing
in all evidence supporting a desired course of action and ignoring all
evidence against, Blix argues, is reminiscent of witch hunts in
past centuries.
Condoning such a violation of the evidentialist
principle corrupts the process of social communication, positioning
the human race into two camps:
those
who "believe
as I do" and those who don't; those who are the "elect slaves of God" and
those who are the "reprobate slaves of evil." Turning against reason
as a corrupter of faith in such a fashion, warns Wood, is fanaticism.
The deconstructionist strain of contemporary
theoretical thought does not fare much better, for it holds that
there is no such thing as universal
truth or
honesty in favor of the view that speech and communication is contingent
and, at best,
an unstable source of meaning. Deconstructive critical reflection,
Wood cautions, can only breed cynicism.
Wood concludes with the observation that many
philosophers have expressed only "bemused,
weary condescension" at the persistent violation of the evidentialist principle.
Rousseau, for example, declared that as civilization grows, so do the devices
by which people evade the truth. In the face of this, Wood urges the abandonment
of fanatical, cynical, or staunchly skeptical positions. Wood leaves us with
the final reflection that leading a complacent life on the basis of denial mechanisms
is not leading the right life according to the evidentialist principle. It is
better to maintain one's dignity and to do right by others than to engage in
denial or self-deception.
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